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FAMILIAL SOCIAL CONTROL AND





The literature pertaining to gender and criminal involvement
and gender and criminal court sanctions has largely remained dis-
connected. We propose that the major explanatory themes in these
two bodies of literature have a common element-sex-based differ-
ences in informal social control. We then test two hypotheses
which examine the relationship between familial social control and
the pretrial release decisions accorded to male (N = 1,558) and fe-
male (N = 1,365) offenders over a sixteen year period (1965-1980).
We find that: (i) the effect of familial social control on evidence of
gender-based leniency in the allocation of pretrial freedom varies
substantially over the sixteen year period; (ii) generally a defend-
ant's gender does not condition the influence of familial social con-
trol on pretrial release status; and (iii) the legal determinants of
pretrial freedom provide the strongest evidence of gender-bias in
the allocation of this criminal sanction. The implications of our work
for future studies of the sex-sanctioning issue are also discussed.
In an earlier article that used longitudinal data to examine the
effect of sex on two criminal court sanctions, the conclusion
emerged that gender-related statuses had a significant effect on re-
ducing evidence of sex-based leniency in the allocation of pretrial
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release decisions.1 The purpose of this Article is to explore
whether and how familial social control, perhaps the most salient
gender-related status, affects the apparent leniency accorded wo-
men in the pretrial release decision. Analysis of this issue will begin
by attempting to sort out the major explanatory variables used in
the extant research on both sex and offense patterns and sex and
criminal court sanctions. Despite the recent proliferation of re-
search on gender and crime, scholars concerned with the sex-sanc-
tioning issue have, seemingly, worked in isolation from scholars
concerned with the relationship between sex and patterns of crimi-
nal involvement. These two bodies of research, however, are highly
interrelated not only because "[p]atterns of crime statistics are af-
fected by the decisions of criminal justice personnel," 2 but also be-
cause of their common explanatory theme-the sex-based system of
informal social control.
II. COMMON FEATURES OF THE GENDER-CRIME, GENDER-
SANCTIONING RESEARCH
The present analysis of the gender-crime and gender-sanction-
ing research is intentionally non-exhaustive. Instead, this analysis is
directed at providing a starting point for reconceptualizing the avail-
able data on these two issues.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the literature is categorized according to
the dependent variable or what is being explained. The literature
can readily be divided according to those studies that attempt to
explain sex-based differences in criminal involvement (i.e., "crimi-
nal behavior") and those that attempt to explain sex-based differ-
ences in sanctioning (i.e., "behavior of the legal system"). This
initial dichotomy can be further broken down according to the level
of the primary explanatory variable. Those studies which use indi-
vidual attitudes and/or values are designated as "individual" para-
digms and those studies that use either the social location of
individuals relative to others or the economic and cultural statuses
of such individuals are designated as "structural" paradigms.
Individual paradigms that focus on the question of the sex-
based differences in patterns of criminal behavior predict that the
sex-role attitudes of men and women explain their differential in-
volvement in crime. Although articulated to varying degrees, this
I Kruttschnitt & Green, The Sex-Sanctioning Issue: Is It History?, 29 AM. Soc. REv. 591
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Kruttschnitt, The Sex-Sanctioning Issue].
2 Nagel & Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, 91, 98
in 4 CRIME ANDJUSTICE (Morris and Tonry eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Nagel, Gender
and Crime].
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FIGURE 1
OPERATIONALIZING AND CATEGORIZING THE VARIOUS THEORETICAL
APPROACHES TO THE QUESTIONS OF SEX DIFFERENCES
IN THE INCIDENCE OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND
SEX-BASED DIFERENCES IN CRIMINAL COURT SANCTIONS
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
DEPENDENT Individual Structural
VARIABLE (Attitudes/Values) (Social/Cultural Statuses)
Sex role attitudes explain Women's economic and cultural
differences in the types and rates of statuses determine the degree to
criminal behavior exhibited by men which they will be involved in
and women. See, e.g., Pollak, 1950a; criminal behavior. See, e.g., Nye,
Morris, 1965b; Adler, 1975c; 1958J; Morris, 1964d; Hoffman-
Criminal Giordano, 1976d; Jensen & Eve, Bustamante, 1973d; Rosenblum,
Behavior 1976d; Eve & Edmonds, 1978d; 1975d; Simon, 1975k; Smart, 19761;
Cullen, et aL, 1979d; Giordano & Weis, 1976d; Harris, 1977m;
Cernkovich, 1979d; Lewis, 1981d; Bowker, 1978d; Steffensmeier,
Norland, et aL, 1981d; Gora, 1982d. 1978d; Bartel, 1979d; Balkan, et at,
198on; Steffensmeier, el aL, 1980d;
Steffensmeier & Steffensmeier,
1980d; Young, 1980d; Campbell,
1981d; Harris & Hill, 1981d;
Steffensmeier, 1981d; Willis, 1981d;
Leonard, 19820.
The gender role attitudes of Sex-based differences in economic
deviance processing agents explain and cultural statuses explain sex-
sex-based differences in criminal based differences in criminal court
court sanctions. See, e.g., Pollak, sanctions. See, e.g., Turk, 1969P;
1950a; Reckless, 1957d; Nagel & Black, 1976q; 1980r; Harris, 1977m;
Behavior of Weitzman, 1971d; DeFleur, 1975d; Hagan, et at, 1979f; Balkan, et aL,Foley & Rasche, 1976d; Chesney- 1980n; Kruttschnitt, 1980-81d,the Legal Lind, 1977, 1980d; Bernstein, et aL, 1982as, 1982bd, 1984d; Daly,System 1979e; Hagan, et aL, 19 79 f; Moulds, 1983d; Kruttschnitt & Green, 1984t;
19809; Steffensmeier, 1980h; Moyer Staples, 1984d.
& White, 1981d; Shelden, 1981d;
Smart, 1981d; Teilman & Landry,
1981d; Nagel & Hagan, 1982i;
Curran, 1983d; Visher, 1983d.
a 0. POLLACK, supra note 8.
b Morris, supra note 4.
C F. ADLER, supra note 6.
d See citation as provided in the APPENDIX of this Article.
e Bernstein, el. aL, supra note 54.
f Hagan, et. aL, supra note 18.
g Moulds, supra note 9.
h Steffensmeier, supra note 11.
Nagel & Hagan, supra note 2.
I. NYE, supra note 12.
k B. SIMON, supra note 13.
1 C. SMART, supra note 3.
m Harris, supra note 26.
n S. BALKAN, supra note 14.
0 E. LEONARD, supra note 14.
P A. TURK, supra note 15.
q D. BLACK, supra note 17.
* D. BLACK, supra note 22.
s Kruttschnitt, supra note 22.
t Kruttschnitt & Green, supra note 1.
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research is presumably based on one aspect of sex-role theory-i.e.,
the notion that both socialization and the later development of the
consciousness and self-perception vary with one's sex.3 An early ex-
ample of this explanatory paradigm can be found in Morris' 4 at-
tempt to ascertain the nature of the relationship between sex and
attitudes toward non-conformity. Morris found that girls were more
critical than boys of delinquency and felt more shame when ques-
tioned about their involvement in known offenses. These sex-based
attitudinal differences are interpreted as providing a greater protec-
tion for girls from the pressures of delinquency.5 Adler's6 theory of
masculinization of female behavior, based on reported increases in
women's criminal behavior, spawned a resurgence in this theoretical
perspective. Maintaining that the attitudes of all women have
changed, she suggests that female offenders are becoming more
competitive with male offenders and more aggressive in their crimi-
nal pursuits. 7 Subsequent tests of this proposition primarily have
been concerned with whether exposure to the tenets of the women's
movement has affected women's traditional sex-role attitudes such
that women would be more apt to engage in crime and delinquency
than heretofore.
A shift from the attitudes of the offender to the attitudes of the
deviance processing agents provides the most popular explanatory
paradigm for sex-based sanctioning differences. For example, in a
classic study of women involved in crime, Otto Pollak postulated
that the general protective attitude of men toward women and chiv-
alry on the part of male officers of the law, in large part, account for
both the preponderance of reported male criminality and the lack of
incarcerated female offenders. 8 The scholarly attention devoted to
women offenders over the past ten years has resulted in a refine-
ment of this chivalry/paternalism thesis 9 and the addition of the
complementary "evil woman thesis" which suggests that women will
be more harshly sanctioned than men because their criminal activity
violates the sex-role stereotypes of deviance processing agents.10
This literature offers little explanation for the hypothesized protec-
3 C. SMART, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE, at 66 (1976).
4 Morris, Attitudes Toward Delinquency By Delinquents, Nondelinquents and Their Friends, 5
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1965).
5 R. SMART, WOMEN AND CRIME, at 68 (1976).
6 F. ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL (1975).
7 Id. at 13-15.
8 0. POLLAK, THE CRIMINALITY OF WOMEN, at 151 (1950).
9 Moulds, Chivalry and Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the CriminalJustice System,
in WOMEN, CRIME AND JUSTICE (S. Datesman & F. Scarpitti eds. 1980).
10 Velimesis, The Female Offender, 7 CRIME & DELINQ. Lrr. 94 (1975).
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tive or punitive judicial attitudes toward women offenders." Conse-
quently, the evidence still suggests that sex-role socialization lies at
the basis of these presumed stereotypical attitudes of deviance
processing agents.
As previously noted, structural explanations for sex-based dif-
ferences in criminal involvement use the economic and cultural po-
sitions of an individual, compared to others in society, as causal
variables. The notion of restricted opportunities has been a central
theme in this literature and it has evolved from a focus on sex-based
differences in social control to a focus on sex-based differences in
labor force opportunities. Ivan Nye, for example, proposed that not
only the family but the wider social environment was more con-
cerned with controlling the behavior of girls than boys, and this re-
sulted, predictably, in the reportedly lower rates of female
delinquency. 12 More recently, the emphasis has shifted to an exami-
nation of the sexual division of the labor market. Some scholars
argue that increases in women's participation in the paid labor force
Will increase their opportunities for committing certain offenses.' 3
Others, however, argue that the longstanding exclusion of women
from the more lucrative economic positions explains the reported
increases in women's involvement in property crimes.' 4
Structural explanations for sex-based differences in criminal
sanctions primarily have focused on the way in which the stratifica-
tion system (or the means by which material rewards and prestige
are allocated) varies with gender. Austin Turk postulated that
powerlessness is a key variable in understanding why certain classes
of people are disproportionately subject to arrest.' 5 However, real-
izing that this variable could not account for the sex differences in
reported crime rates, Turk notes that the confinement of women in
the home restricts the activities of females more than those of
males. 16 The implication is that the traditional division of labor has
provided women with a buttress, in the form of familial responsibili-
ties, against legal invocations. Black' 7 and Hagan, 18 also posit, in
11 Cf. Moulds, supra note 9; Nagel, Gender and Crime, supra note 2; Steffensmeier,
Assessing the Impact of the Women's Movement on Sex-based Differences in the Handling of Adult
Criminal Defendants, 26 Crime & Delinq. 399 (1980). '
12 1. NYE, FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR (1958).
13 See, e.g., B. SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME (1975).
14 See, e.g., E. LEONARD, WOMEN, CRIME AND SocIETY: A CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY (1982); S. BALKAN, R. BERGER & J. SCHMIDT, CRIME AND DEVIANCE IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL APPROACH (1980).
15 A. TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER (1969).
16 Id. at 165-69.
17 D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976).
18 Hagan, Simpson & Gillis, The Sexual Stratiflcation of Social Control. A Gender-Based
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slightly different ways, that the sex-based system of stratification
covaries with the informal social control found in families and kin-
ship groups.
Black proposes that stratification explains social control of
every kind-legal and non-legal-and that inequality of wealth var-
ies directly with social control; those who have the most wealth also
have the greatest capacity to exercise social control.' 9 With regard
to non-legal instances of social control, Black draws particular atten-
tion to the way in which authority in both modem and aristocratic
families is allocated to those with the most economic resources. For
example, he suggests that: "[M]ost wives are dependent upon the
wealth of their husbands, and so, in general, they are criticized and
disciplined more by their husbands than are their husbands by
them. This difference decreases as the income and other wealth of
the wife increases and with equality it disappears. ' '20
Although Black is not concerned with articulating a gender-
based theory of crime, another proposition of his theory-that for-
mal social controls (such as legal activity) are inversely related to
informal social controls (such as family and kinship activity)-speaks
precisely to this issue.21 That is, if women are subject to more infor-
mal social control vis-a-vis their positions of economic dependency,
they will be subject to less formal, legal control.22
Hagan and his colleagues are concerned with proposing a gen-
der-based theory of crime, and the fundamental perspective under-
lying their thesis is Black's proposition concerning the inverse
relationship between formal and informal social controls. 23 Their
application of this proposition to the gender-crime issue is carefully
linked to an examination of the sex-based system of stratification.
Elaborating on Scull's thesis 24 that advancing capitalism increas-
ingly moved workers out of the home and in so doing created sepa-
rate formal systems of crime control, they note that crime control
was a gender-specific phenomenon: women were subject to the in-
formal controls of family life while men were subject to the formal
Perspective on Crime and Delinquency, 30 BRIT.J. Soc. 25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hagan,
Sexual Stratification].
19 D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAWV, supra note 17, at 31-32.
20 Id. at 32.
21 Id. at 107.
22 See also D. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 125-26 (1980);
Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime, & Dependency: An Application of the Theory of Law, 19 CRIMINOL-
OGY 995 (1982a).
23 Hagan, Sexual Stratification, supra note 18, at 27.
24 Scull, Aadness and Segregative Controls: The Rise of the Insane Asylum, 24 Soc. PROBS.
337 (1977).
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control mechanisms of the public sector. Thus, combining Black's
proposition with Scull's thesis, they hypothesize that women will be
both the objects and instruments of informal social controls. 25 Wo-
men rarely will incur legal controls because of the amount of infor-
mal control to which they are subject; and, because of the sexually-
stratified nature of the control structures, women will be instrumen-
tal in maintaining informal controls within the family.
Finally, note that other structural attempts to explain the rela-
tively lenient treatment accorded women by deviance processing
agents also center on the traditional family structure that has kept
women out of the public sector and firmly within the confines of the
home. As Harris states, the reassignment of women from homes to
prisons would cause a number of disequilibrating outcomes, includ-
ing the breakup of the nuclear family.26
In summary, two recurring propositions appear throughout the
foregoing discussion: (1) the sex-based system of stratification, and
2) sex role socialization. An element common to both may be the
difference in the quantity of informal social control to which men
and women are subject. Consistent with both Black27 and Hagan, 28
the law and its application will be identified with formal social con-
trol and family, kinship and peer group activity with informal social
control.
The relationship between informal social control and the sex-
based system of stratification is best depicted in the previously
noted works of Black29 and Hagan and his colleagues.30 To reiter-
ate, the exclusion of women from the public arena and from the
competition for economic rewards has resulted in their being the
objects of informal "familial" control. With regard to sex role so-
cialization, studies indicate that parents give more freedom to their
male children than their female children.3' Moreover, above and
beyond the additional liberties given male children, the very charac-
teristics that parents traditionally instill in their male children-ag-
gression, independence and self-assertiveness-as opposed to the
characteristics they foster in their female offspring-passivity, com-
pliance and dependence-connote the absence or presence of social
25 Hagan, Sexual Stratification, supra note 18, at 28.
26 Harris, Sex and Theories of Deviance: Toward a Functional Theory of Deviant Type-Scripts,
42 AM. Soc. RE.v. 3, 13 (1977).
27 D. BLACK, supra note 17.
28 Hagan, Seual Stratification, supra note 18, at 27-28.
29 D. BLACK, supra note 17.
30 Hagan, Sexual Stratification, supra note 18.
31 See J. NEWSON & E. NEWSON, FOUR YEARS OLD IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1968); H.
YORBURG, SEXUAL IDENTITY 169 (1975).
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control.3 2 Therefore, the amount of informal social control in
men's and women's lives is assumed to covary with these two
predictors of sex-based differences in criminal involvement and sex-
based differences in responses to criminal involvement. Accord-
ingly, a key assumption of this study, most eloquently stated by
Black, is that law is inversely related to other non-legal forms of so-
cial control.3 3 Familial social control is used as an indicator of non-
legal or informal social control in order to test the narrower propo-
sition that controlling for the quantity of familial social control in
male and female offenders' lives will eliminate sex-based discrepan-
cies in the allocation of criminal court sanctions.
In addition, as noted in this review, a number of scholars main-
tain that a causal factor in the reported increases in female crime is
the shift in sex role socialization. The informal social controls to
which women traditionally have been subject are thought to have
diminished. If true, familial social control presumably would be less
important to a court's determination of a female offender's sanction
than heretofore, simply because familial social control no longer
would be a salient "female" trait. Thus, within a sixteen year time
frame, it will be argued that the effect of familial social control on
the sanctions accorded female offenders will diminish over time.
III. THE STUDY DESIGN
A. THE SAMPLE
The study encompasses a stratified random sample of male (N
1,558) and female (N = 1,365) criminal defendants who were
processed through the Department of Court Services in Hennepin
County (Minneapolis), Minnesota. The sample was stratified on the
basis of sex, offense of conviction-theft, forgery and drug law vio-
lations-and year of conviction-1965 through 1980. The informa-
tion gathered on each subject was obtained from the presentence
investigation report.
B. THE VARIABLES
1. Pretrial Release Status
The dependent variable is pretrial release status. Pretrial re-
lease refers to the terms under which a defendant may be allowed to
remain free in the interim between arrest and case disposition. Be-
cause the data relate primarily to individuals who were convicted of
32 Hagan, Sexual Stratification, supra note 18.
33 D. BLAcK, supra note 17, at 107.
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the offense(s) with which they were charged, the sample may not be
representative of the total population subject to pretrial release de-
cisions.3 4 Nevertheless, the following patterns, which have impor-
tant theoretical implications for this study, warranted an
examination of this preconviction decision. First, pretrial release is
a disposition where leniency toward women has been particularly
evident.3 5 Second, previous research indicates that any evidence of
sex discrimination in the decision to incarcerate was due largely to
the fact that women are significantly more likely to obtain pretrial
freedom than men.3 6 The decision to examine this pre-adjudicatory
stage, therefore, is based not only on its noted impact on later
stages of the dispositional process,3 7 but also its direct relevance to
the sex-sanctioning issue.
The majority of studies examining the pretrial release decision
dichotomize this variable according to whether the defendant ob-
tained pretrial freedom.38 However, as Nagel and Hagan point out,
a dichotomy that merely indicates whether the defendant was de-
tained prior to adjudication merges the judicial determination of the
release condition offered with the defendant's ability to make bail.3 9
In other words, the natural ranking as to the degree of restrictive-
ness placed on defendants is lost because individuals who were re-
leased on their own recognizance are not differentiated from those
who had to meet a set of conditions (e.g., surety bond, ten percent
cash deposit) for release. Further, an analysis which is primarily
concerned with whether the court is extending preferential treat-
ment to females should be sensitive to the degree to which women
are given less restrictive options for obtaining pretrial freedom than
men. Thus, as Table 1 illustrates, an ordinal level measure of pre-
trial release is used: individuals obtaining bond prior to release are
34 See, e.g., Klepper, Wagin & Tierney, Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System: A
Critical Appraisal of the Literature, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR RE-
FORM 55-128 (A. Blumstein, et al. eds. 1983).
35 Nagel, Gender and Crime, supra note 2.
36 Kruttschnitt & Green, The Sex-Sanctioning Issue: Is It History?, 29 AM. Soc. REv. at
545-47 (1984).
37 See also Bernstein, Kelley & Doyle, Societal Reaction to Deviants: The Case of Criminal
Defendants, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 793 (1977); Lizotte, Extra-Legal Factors in Chicago's Criminal
Courts: Testing the Conflict Model of Criminal Justice, 25 Soc. PROBS. 569 (1978); Spohn,
Gruhl & Welch, The Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Re-examination of an Unsettled Question, 16
LAW & Soc. REv. 71 (1981-82).
38 See, e.g., Bernstein, Kick, Leung, & Schultz, Charge Reduction: An Intermediary Stage in
the Process of Labeling Criminal Defendants, 56 Soc. FORCES 362 (1977); Farrell & Swigert,
Prior Offense as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 12 LAw & Soc. REv. 937 (1978); Myers, Offended
Parties and Official Reactions: Victims and Sentencing of Criminal Defendants, 20 Soc. Q. 529
(1979); Spohn, Gruhl & Welch, supra note 37.
39 Nagel, Gender and Crime, supra note 2, at 119.
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ranked between those initially released on their own recognizance
and those who never obtained pretrial freedom.40
TABLE 1
VARIABLES, SCALES, ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES AND RELATED




(0) Males (1) DIFFERENCE
VARIABLES SCALES (N= 1,365) (N= 1,558) OF MEANS r
Dependent:
Pretrial 0. Own Recognizance 55.8 (722) 32.5 (480) p=.000 .23
Release 1. Out on Bond 30.3 (392) 41.4 (612)






penalty) Interval X = 7.59 X = 8.03 p=.026 .04
(s.d. 4.36) (s.d. 6.25)
Prior
Offense
History(2) Interval -X = .20 X = .17 p=.000 .20
Pending (s.d. .68) (s.d. 1.10)
Pending
Criminal
Court Cases Interval X = .11 X = .24 p=.000 .11
(s.d. .40) (s.d. .65)
Employment 0. Unemployed 62.6 (749) 49.4 (656) p=.000 .15
Status 1. Part-time 11.5 (138) 9.7 (129)
2. Full-time 25.9 (310) 40.8 (542)
Familial
Social Interval X = .20 X = -. 20 p=.000 -.23
Control(2) (s.d. .94) (s.d. .78)
(2) The range of possible scores on this variable, for males and females respectively,
appears in Note 45.
2. Independent Variables
As can be seen in Table 1, three "legal" variables are included,
each of which is an important determinant of the pretrial release
40 Note that in a preliminary analysis the pretrial release decision was dichotomized
and a high value was assigned to those defendants who were detained. Although dichot-
omizing this variable produces results comparable to the results presented in this Arti-
cle, for the previously noted theoretical reasons, the ordinal level measure is employed.
See also Bernstein, Kelley & Doyle, Societal Reaction to Deviants: The Case of Criminal Defend-
ants, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 793 (1977); Hagan, Nagel (Bernstein) & Abonetti, Differential Sen-
tencing of White-Collar Offenders in Ten Federal District Courts, 95 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1980).
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decision: 41 prior offense history, pending criminal court cases and
offense severity.42 Also shown are indicators for the offender's em-
ployment status and the quantity of familial social control in his/her
life. Employment status is included both because courts use this va-
riable in determining whether the defendant is a "flight risk" and
because employed individuals have a better chance of making bond
or a cash alternative if bail is set. Thus, employment involving the
interaction of peer and work groups can be viewed as an indicator of
informal social control.43 Although the primary concern is with the
informal social control found in the family setting, this variable will
be examined, at least in part, in light of its relationship to this
study's underlying assumption regarding the relationship between
law and other types of informal social control.
Note, however, the information that is not readily apparent
from Table 1. In order to maximize the information obtained on
each offender's life history and in order to increase the stability of
the parameter estimates, additive scales were created for the prior
offense history and familial social control variables. The specific
items included in the prior offense history scale are: total number of
arrests and convictions, total number of years previously on proba-
tion and total number of years previously incarcerated. The items
comprising the familial social control scale are: household composi-
tion, number of children under seven years of age, number of chil-
dren actually living with the offender, and the offender's degree of
economic dependency. The centrality of the familial social control
41 See, e.g., Nagel, The Legal/Extra-Legal Controversy: Judicial Decisions in Pretrial Release,
17 LAW & Soc. REV. 981 (1983).
42 There has been considerable debate about the appropriateness of utilizing maxi-
mum statutory penalty as a means of operationalizing offense severity. See, e.g., Hagan &
Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing Research, in 2 RE-
SEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 12-13 (A. Blumstein, et. aL eds.
1983). To control for each of the offenses subsumed within the offense categories of
theft, forgery and drug law violations, a set of dummy dichotomous variables were used
in a preliminary analysis. Comparing the results of these yearly equations to those that
used maximum statutory penalty revealed no differences in the coefficients. Because the
reliability of regression statistics is affected by the number of independent variables rela-
tive to the sample size (see F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZUR, MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARCH 446-47 (1973)), and because the yearly models are, in some cases,
based on a relatively small sample, using the statutory maximum penalty as a measure of
offense severity provided a sounder methodological approach.
Race and educational attainment were not included in the equations because previ-
ous analyses revealed that they had no significant effect on either the dependent variable
or our variables of theoretical concern. See Kruttschnitt & Green, The Sex-Sanctioning
Issue: Is It History?, 29 AM. Soc. REV. 591 (1984).
43 See, D. BLACK, supra note 17, at 111-12.
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scale to our analysis warrants a brief explanation as to why these
specific variables were chosen as indicators of familial social control.
First, the supervisory activities that occur in all domestic set-
tings are one of the most rudimentary aspects of familial social con-
trol. Household composition is included, then, in an attempt to
capture this activity by ranking the individuals with whom the of-
fender lived, from low to high social control, as follows: (0) living
alone, (1) living with one other adult (e.g., spouse/relative), (2) liv-
ing with only their children, and (3) living with their children and
another adult. Second, both the number of children living with the
offender and the number of children under seven years of age are
included because child-rearing responsibilities, especially when the
children are young, place considerable constraints on adults' ac-
tions. Finally, a measure of economic dependency is included to
recognize that aspect of familial social control that results from the
economic inequality within a household.44
Although the data contained information regarding the of-
fender's source of support, a cross-classification of individuals ac-
cording to their marital status and source of support is included in
order to ensure the presence of familial control in conjunction with
the economic support. For example, two women may be equal in
their degree of financial dependency, but if one relies on her hus-
band for support and the other relies on the government for sup-
port (e.g., a welfare recipient), the quantity of familial control to
which they are subject will differ. Cross-classifying source of sup-
port and marital status resulted in twelve categories of dependency
which also were ranked from low -e.g, the totally independent indi-
viduals who were self-supporting and single-to high degrees of
familial control-e.g., the totally dependent individuals which in-
cluded the unemployed who were supported by their spouses.
C. ANALYSES
The analysis begins with the creation of these familial social
control and prior offense history scales. Both were initially derived
from principal component factor analyses with orthogonal rotation.
One-factor models fit the data quite well, resulting in two factors
with eigen values exceeding + 1. An examination of the factor load-
ings on the principal factor for each item within each set showed all
factor loadings higher than .90, with most of the loadings .60 or
higher. Based on the factor weights, standardized scores were com-
puted for each individual for the variables within each factor, thus
44 Id. at 32; D. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 123 (1980).
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creating two additive scales. 45
The pretrial release decision analysis is based on ordinary least
squares regression. A separate equation is estimated for each of the
years encompassed by the data set. A concern with the effect of fa-
milial social control on the sanctions accorded female offenders
over time, and a concern with providing the most accurate estima-
tion of the gender-sanctioning relationship over a sixteen year pe-
riod suggested this methodology. 46 The initial year-by-year analysis
was done in three steps: 1) a regression of pretrial release status on
sex and the three legal variables; 2) a regression of pretrial release
status on sex, the legal variables and employment status; and 3) a
regression of pretrial release status on all of our independent vari-
ables.47 The second phase of the analysis involved examining sepa-
rately the effect of each of the independent variables on the pretrial
release decision for males and females over the sixteen year
period.48
IV. RESULTS
A. DOES FAMILIAL SOCIAL CONTROL ELIMINATE EVIDENCE OF
GENDER-BASED LENIENCY IN PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS?
Table 2 presents the results of three year-by-year sets of OLS
analyses. The first set of equations, which controls only for the of-
fender's offense, pending criminal cases and prior offense history,
largely are consistent with previous research: female defendants
fare better than male defendants in pretrial decisions. 49 More spe-
cifically, in twelve of the sixteen years examined, women were more
likely to obtain freedom prior to the adjudication of their cases than
men. The over-time trends also are consistent with a previous anal-
ysis and suggest that the changing social and political climate of
45 For the prior offense history scales, scores for males range from a low of -. 592 to
a high of + 13.415; for females the range extends from -. 592 to +7.840. For the famil-
ial social control scale, males' scores range from -. 983 to +9.764 and females' scores
range from -. 983 to +4.450.
46 See also Greenberg, Socioeconomic Status and Criminal Sentences: Is There an Association?,
42 AM. Soc. REv. 174, 175 (1977); Thomson, & Zingraff, Detecting Sentencing Disparity:
Some Problems and Evidence, 86 AM. J. Soc. 869, 874-75 (1981).
47 Only the sex coefficients are reported for this portion of the analyses because of
the cumbersome nature of reproducing all 48 equations. The full equations are avail-
able from the authors upon request.
48 The entire sample population was used for the analyses of the pretrial release de-
cision; attrition in the sizes of the samples upon which these equations are based is due
to the manner in which missing data are handled by the normal listwise regression pro-
cedure. Further, an examination of all equations and their corresponding matrices re-
vealed no identification problems.
49 See Nagel, Gender and Crime, supra note 2.
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TABLE 2
SEX COEFFICIENTS FOR THREE SETS OF YEARLY EQUATIONS WHICH
REGRESS PRETRIAL RELEASE STATUS ON SEX AND (I) A SET OF
LEGAL VARIABLES, (II) EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND (III) FAMILIAL
SOCIAL CONTROLt
CONTROLLING FOR CONTROLLING FOR CONTROLLING FOR
LEGAL VARIABLES EMPLOYMENT STATUS FAMILIAL SOCIAL
CONTROL
YEAR b for sex R2  (N) b for sex R2  (N) b for sex R2  (N)
1965 .485* .10 (82) .604** .23 (78) .600** .23 ( 78)
1966 .077 .09 (96) .100 .20 (88) .092 .20 (88)
1967 .103 .20 (115) .026 .23 (109) .026 .23 (109)
1968 .071 .15 (175) .059 .21 (155) .052 .21 (155)
1969 .424** .16 (138) .373** .15 (118) .360** .15 (118)
1970 .321** .20 (199) .310** .22 (188) .273** .24 (188)
1971 .307** .23 (236) .376** .30 (223) .361** .31 (223)
1972 .364** .11 (154) .448** .23 ( 90) .428** .25 ( 90)
1973 .187* .17 (176) .229* .22 (162) .132 .33 (162)
1974 .050 .27 (192) .117 .24 (141) -. 041 .28 (141)
1975 .232* .25 (173) .204* .27 (162) .132 .28 (162)
1976 .199* .13 (173) .198* .16 (162) .151 .18 (162)
1977 .185* .10 (216) .223* .13 (203) .153 .16 (203)
1978 .346** .17 (187) .426** .23 (164) .385** .25 (164)
1979 .266* .21 (162) .384** .26 (150) .333** .28 (150)
1980 .180* .11 (205) .205* .15 (189) .138 .16 (189)
t Significance levels are reported for a one-tailed test because direction
is predicted: *p < .05
**p Z" .01
the late 1960's and early 1970's had no impact on evidence of gen-
der-based leniency in the allocation of this criminal court sanction. 50
A second set of equations includes the employment status coef-
ficient. Generally, the addition of this variable increases the per-
centage of variance explained (R2) in the pretrial release decision.
Because (1) the offenders least likely to be released pending court
disposition are those who are considered to be flight risks, and
(2) employment provides some assurances against risk of flight, this
finding is not terribly surprising.5" However, the apparent effect of
this variable on the sex coefficients was unanticipated. Adding em-
ployment status to the equations not only fails to reduce the appar-
ent advantages judges give to females, but it also accentuates some
of the previously noted sex differences. Specifically, in eight of the
twelve years in which sex previously was shown to be a significant
50 Kruttschnitt, The Sex-Sanctioning Issue, supra note 1.
51 Note, however, that-there is some evidence that judges may be moving away from
this traditional focus on whether the defendant is likely to be a flight risk to an assess-
ment of the defendant's dangerousness. See, e.g., Goldkamp, Bail: Discrimination and
Control, 16 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 103 (1984).
[Vol. 76
1985] GENDER AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL
predictor of pretrial freedom, introducing the offender's employ-
ment status increased the size of the sex coefficient. Because the
workplace provides a structure of informal social control and be-
cause, historically, paid labor force participation has been more
characteristic of males than females, holding constant this poten-
tially "male-dominated" status may have diminished any advantages
male offenders had in the competition for lenient sanctions.
A third and final set of equations illustrates the effect of adding
the familial social control indicator to our explanatory model. Sex is
no longer a significant predictor of pretrial freedom in five of the
twelve years where it was previously significant: 1973, 1975, 1976,
1977 and 1980. Why the sex effect diminishes in only these specific
years is an open, and sociologically intriguing, question in that it
does not fit neatly into a political or socio-historical explanation.
Certainly, because these five years all post-date the beginning of leg-
islative reform aimed at eliminating sex discrimination, 52 judicial be-
havior may have been affected by the women's rights movement. In
other words, introducing a variable that would equalize sex-based
differences in stratification after 1972 results in a diminishing sex
effect. This interpretation finds support from the fact that from
1970 through 1980 the addition of the familial social control varia-
ble consistently increases the amount of explained variation in the
pretrial release decision. However, such an explanation cannot ac-
count for the relatively sizeable and significant effects of sex on pre-
trial release decisions in both 1978 and 1979. Thus, in an effort to
further understand the way in which this indicator of informal social
control is affecting the pretrial decisions accorded males and fe-
males while simultaneously moving toward a test of our second hy-
pothesis, the data was reanalyzed within categories of sex. The
results are found in Table 3.
B. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF FAMILIAL CONTROL OVER TIME ON
FEMALES' ABILITY TO GAIN PRETRIAL FREEDOM?
Table 3 suggests that familial social control is a significant pre-
dictor of pretrial freedom for women primarily in the early to mid-
1970's (1971 through 1975). The latter half of the 1970's, however,
reveals no definitive pattern. While familial social control has no
significant effect on pretrial sanctions in 1976, 1978, 1979 or 1980,
it does surface as a significant variable in 1977.
Given the thrust of the gender-crime and gender-sanctioning
52 H. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATz & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW:
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literature, familial social control presumably would have a more
consistent impact on the pretrial sanctions accorded females, espe-
cially in the 1960's. The limited findings for this variable may, in
part, be due to the fact that by analyzing the data within both years
and sex cohorts, the female data base is substantially reduced. The
attrition of cases is particularly evident in the early years and, of
course, makes it more difficult to achieve statistical significance.
Nevertheless, even assuming that familial social control might have
been an important predictor of women's pretrial release statuses in
the mid to late 1960's, the emergence of this variable as a significant
predictor of women's sanctions in 1977 makes it difficult to discern
whether there is in fact any "time-specific" effect.
Of central concern, however, is the finding that the determi-
nants of the pretrial decisions for males and females appear quite
distinct. For example, whereas familial social control has a signifi-
cant effect on a woman's ability to remain free prior to the adjudica-
tion of her case in six of the sixteen years, a man is accorded the
same benefit only in one of the sixteen years (1973). Similarly, em-
ployed men are significantly more likely to obtain pretrial freedom
than unemployed men in eleven of these sixteen years; for women,
the comparable set of circumstances appears in only three years.
Even the legal variables appear to interact with sex. Pending crimi-
nal cases and prior offense history emerge as significant predictors
in almost every year for males. For females, however, the effect of
these variables is much leaner and more sporadic.
In order to test whether these apparent male-female differences
are significant, the statistical significance of these coefficients across
equations was calculated for each year.5 3 Table 4 presents the t-
53 Table 3 tests whether the coefficients for males and those for females differ signifi-
candy from zero, not whether they differ significantly from each other. It is possible, for
example, that the coefficient for a variable is significant for males but not for females
while, at the same time, the coefficients for males and females do not differ significantly
from one another. In order to address this issue, we calculated the slopes for each in-
dependent variable for the different populations using the following t-test:
t = b - b2
VVar (b.) + Var (b2)
where b, is, for example, the employment coefficient for females and b2 is the em-
ployment coefficient for males. Var (bl) and Var (b2) are the estimated variances of
the coefficients for females and males, respectively. See Cohen, Comparing Regression
Coefficients Across Subsamples, 12 Soc. METHODS & RESEARCH 77 (1983).
This problem also could be addressed by combining the two populations, treat-
ing sex as an independent variable, and creating interaction terms for sex and each
of the other independent variables. See F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZUR, MULTIPLE
REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1973). However, because the data are ana-
lyzed within yearly intervals thereby decreasing the number of cases for each equa-
tion, the addition of interaction effects may cause spurious significant t-values. See
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values for both the coefficients that appeared to be sex-specific
predictors of pretrial release (i.e., the variables which had a signifi-
cant effect on the sanctions accorded to only one group in any given
year) and those that appeared to have virtually the same effect, re-
gardless of gender, on pretrial release status. The most consistent
evidence of gender bias appears in the legal variables. One or more
of these coefficients have a significantly different effect on pretrial
release decisions, depending on the defendant's gender, in eleven
of the sixteen years. The employment status and familial social con-
trol coefficients provide somewhat weaker evidence of sex-specific
effects in that significantly different slopes appear in just one-half of
the years in which sex differences previously occurred (see Table 3).
This is particularly noteworthy in the case of familial social control
where the slopes for males and females differ significantly from one
another in only three years.
TABLE 4
T-RATio FOR SLOPES OF SEX FOR EACH INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
OFFENSE PENDING EMPLOY. FAMILIAL




1968 2.327** 1.365 .345 3.938**
1969 -2.352**
1970 2.832** .029
1971 1.557 .822 1.571 4.122**
1972 .249 3.739** -3.839**
1973 -.811 -1.151 1.824* 2.537** -.470
1974 2.074* -.864 .031
1975 .162 -2.156*
1976 4.175** -1.150 -.857
1977 -5.970** 1.358 -1.670* 1.071 -1.152
1978 -.570 2.828** 1.809*
1979 -1.048 3.292** .428
1980 2.663** -.984 1.519
*P < .05
** p< .01
There are several possible explanations for this finding. One
possibility is simply that familial social control is not generally used
J. COHEN & P. COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 168 (1983).
168 [Vol. 76
1985] GENDER AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL 169
as a gender-specific determinant of pretrial release. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with our finding that familial control had little ef-
fect on the gender-sanctioning relationships initially observed (i.e.,
Table 2) and the finding of Bernstein and her colleagues that single-
parent males appear to receive the same dispositional advantages
accorded female heads-of-households. 54 Another possibility, which
speaks to both the familial control and employment findings, is that
changes in the social roles of men and women have produced a con-
vergence in the way in which these extra-legal variables affect the
gender-sanctioning relationship. This interpretation, however, ig-
nores the fact that most of the significant differences in the slopes
occur after 1970 and, as late as 1978, the relationship between em-
ployment and pretrial release status differs for men and women.
Taken together, then, a rather complex set of interactions emerge
which clearly cannot provide a "yes" or "no" answer to the question
of how and when informal social controls mediate the gender-sanc-
tioning relationship. Although some gender-specific effects on pre-
trial release decisions are evident, this observation must be qualified
in light of its sporadic appearance over the subject time span.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by reviewing the explanations most com-
monly given for both the relationship between sex and criminal in-
volvement and the relationship between sex and criminal sanctions.
A unifying element in these explanations was then identified: the
difference in the quantity of informal social control to which men
and women are subject. Utilizing Black's proposition that legal and
non-legal forms of social control are inversely related, and assuming
that familial social control is one aspect of informal social control,
the hypothesis that holding constant the quantity of familial social
control in the lives of male and female offenders would reduce any
noted evidence of gender-based leniency in the allocation of pretrial
freedom was introduced. Given the assumed changes in sex role
socialization and the increases in the numbers of women employed
outside of the home, the effect over time of familial social control on
the sanctions given to female offenders was examined as well.
The initial hypothesis received only partial support. The addi-
tion of familial social control to the equations eliminated the appar-
ent preferential treatment given to women in only five of the twelve
years where sex was shown to be a significant predictor of the pre-
54 Bernstein, Cardascia & Ross, Defendant's Sex and Criminal Court Decisions, in DISCRIM-
INATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 350 (R. Alvarez & K. Lutterman eds. 1979).
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trial release decision. In light of previous analysis of the sex-sanc-
tioning question,55 these findings strongly suggest the importance
of examining how a wide variety of gender-related statuses affect
pretrial release decisions. Specifically, in earlier work, other vari-
ables which were assumed to reflect some of the social and cultural
differences between men and women in our society (e.g., history of
psychiatric treatment and physical health problems) were included,
in addition to indicators of economic dependency and household
composition. While this earlier study suggests that the variables re-
lating to familial social control were key factors in explaining sex-
based sentencing differentials, these findings were not improved by
focusing specifically on the familial social control variable. This
suggests a reconsideration of a broader explanatory framework that
would include not only an array of gender-related statuses but also
the attitudes of the judiciary. Nagel has referred to this as "bench
bias," or the tendency of particular judges to prefer some outcomes
to others regardless of the type of case. 56 Certainly the sporadic
effect of sex on pretrial release decisions between 1965 and 1980
suggests that "bench bias" may, in fact, be a factor.
Testing the second hypothesis, an examination of how familial
social control affects pretrial release outcomes over time for fe-
males, revealed that: (1) irrespective of time period, there is little
evidence that familial control is a sex-specific determinant of sanc-
tioning, and (2) the strongest evidence for gender bias appears from
the way in which sex conditions how the legal variables impact pre-
trial release decisons. Nagel and Hagan note in their careful review
of the extant gender-sanctioning literature that no research has
sought to ascertain what predicts the allocation of pretrial freedom
for males and females. 57 Having found some evidence of significant
sex differences in the criteria used for determining who will obtain
pretrial freedom, an exploration to determine what lies at the base
of this seemingly discriminatory pattern is needed.
Here again the findings with regard to familial social control
suggest that a broader look at the determinants of informal social
control in the lives of men and women is in order. That is, even
though women's lives traditionally have been circumscribed by fam-
ily responsibilities, it is clear from both this study and previous
work58 that this factor alone cannot explain the differential treat-
55 Kruttschnitt, The Sex-Sanctioning Issue, supra note 1.
56 Nagel, The Legal/Extra-Legal Controversy: Judicial Decisions in Pretrial Release, 17 LAw
& Soc. REV. 481, 506 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Nagel, Pretrial Release].
57 Nagel, Gender and Crime, supra note 2, at 121.
58 Kruttschnitt, The Sex-Sanctioning Issue, supra note 1.
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ment women are accorded in criminal court. In fact, it is only when
the effects of both employment and familial control over the sixteen
years are examined that any consistent evidence of informal social
control interacting with the defendant's gender is found. Unfortu-
nately, the findings lack one distinct measure of informal control
that would allow for a cleaner assessment of how sex covaries with
this variable so as to impact pretrial release status. Nevertheless,
because there is evidence of gender bias based on either familial
control or employment status in roughly one-half of the years ex-
amined, either (1) the reported shifts in women's social positions
are over-rated since women are still the primary caretakers of chil-
dren even with the addition of careers,59 or (2) despite actual status
changes there is still a residual sex effect in the courts based on gen-
der per se. The data only suggest these possible interpretations;
they are, of course, subjects for future research.
Second, having found strong evidence of an interaction be-
tween sex and the legal determinants of pretrial release, a few tenta-
tive explanations emerge. On the one hand, judges may be less
interested in women's-as opposed to men's--offense histories if
they routinely find them to be both quantitatively and qualitatively
less problematic. On the other hand, the judiciary may assume that
women would be less dangerous if freed prior to adjudication than
men regardless of their offense history. Because "perceived likeli-
hood of dangerousness" has been shown to be a key extra-legal fac-
tor in the determination of pretrial decisions, 60 and because this
variable fits into sex-role stereotypes, this variable may be particu-
larly important in future attempts to explain the sex-specific criteria
used for allocating pretrial freedom.
This study, of course, only begins the arduous task of sorting
out how, and suggesting why, the determinants of pretrial decisions
differ for males and females. The results are tempered by contex-
tual effects in that they apply to only one criminal court jurisdiction
and in that the significance of our predictors vary over time. Cer-
tainly there is ample room for debate and future research. Never-
theless, finding substantial sex-based differences in the criteria used
for allocating pretrial release outcomes suggests the need to explore
the criteria used by other deviance processing agents. As noted at
the outset, scholars interested in sanctioning patterns have much to
gain from examining the criminal involvement literature. For too
59 See, e.g., Cummings, Value Stretch in Definitions of Career Among College Women: Horatio
Alger as Feminist Model, 25 Soc. PROBS. 65 (1977).
60 Nagel, Pretrial Release, supra note 56, at 512-13.
172 KRUTTSCHNITT AND MCCARTHY [Vol. 76
long these two bodies of research have remained distinct. This
study suggests that both can be successfully combined, and indeed
should be reexamined to further our understanding of the bases for
gender bias in the allocation of criminal court sanctions.
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